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This paper analyses the transmission channels through which mass violent conflict and post-
conflict fragility affect households. It does so by pointing out how a fragile environment impairs 
a household’s core functions, boundaries, and its choice of income generating activities. 
Furthermore, it proposes a tool to analyse the impact of conflict and fragility on groups of 
households. The paper advances our understanding of mass violent conflict and fragility and 
contributes to the literature on the economics of conflict and development in three ways: first, it 
identifies the important gaps in the current micro level literature on conflict. Second, it provides 
a consistent and systematic framework to address these gaps. Third, it applies the framework to 
war widows, one example of a conflict affected and often forgotten group that typically amounts 
to a large population share in post-conflict societies. 
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1 Introduction   
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the number and intensity of mass violent conflicts has 
decreased worldwide (Human Security Centre 2005). However, this trend does not hold true 
for sub-Saharan Africa, where most of the world’s armed conflicts currently take place. At the 
turn of the twenty-first century, more people were killed in wars in this region than in the rest 
of the world combined (ibid.: 24f. and 32f.). Yet little is known about how mass violent 
conflict and a fragile environment following conflict affect poor households and how poor 
households cope with such an environment.  
The paper has three objectives: First, it identifies the gaps in the current micro level literature 
on conflict. Second, it provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of these gaps. Third, 
it applies the framework to widows, one example of a conflict affected group which typically 
amounts to a large population share in post-conflict societies. Extreme cases include the wars 
in Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Rwanda, for which it has been estimated that 700,000, one 
million, and 500,000 women were brought into widowhood, respectively (Stewart 1993: 371; 
United Nations 2001: 9).  
The paper finds that, first, household boundaries, activities, and intra-household relations and 
gender roles are likely to be affected strongly by mass violent conflict and fragility. The 
households of widows of conflict may be particularly impaired by conflict. For instance, they 
may also face a different set of incentives to reorganize household membership as a result of 
their vulnerable social position. The second finding holds that households are likely to be 
constrained in their choice of coping strategies because conflict potentially destructs various 
production inputs and assets and interrupts markets. As a result, a household’s income 
generating activities may entail higher risk and a reduced profit margin. Lastly, the paper 
proposes a new approach of defining and analysing groups.  
These findings have several implications for further research. The conceptual issues raised in 
this paper may be verified empirically in order to quantify the impact of conflict on 
households and on groups of households. However, the paper cautions that there are several 
challenges inherent in such an empirical approach, such as changed household composition 
and core functions, which may render it difficult to identify households from survey data. 
Hence, a combination of different research methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, 
is proposed to address these issues.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: The next section summarizes recent research on the 
household, economic studies on conflict, and widows of conflict. The subsequent section 
identifies research gaps and derives three research questions. Section 4 provides a conceptual 
framework tracing the impact of mass violent conflict on household structure and production 
decisions; it also discusses the studying of a group of households as a unit for analysing the 
impact of conflict. Section 5 concludes.  
2  State of the art of research  
2.2  Literature on the household  
A household is often considered in the economic literature as the smallest analytical unit of 
production and consumption. It is also a relevant unit for policymakers, as households are 
perceived to be identical to housing. Furthermore, it is often assumed that family is a     2
precondition for a household; therefore ‘household’ is often assumed to be the basic decision 
making unit regarding fertility, divorce, and migration (Kuijsten and Vossen 1988: 4f.). 
Definitions of household may also be influenced by statistical offices. These organizations are 
typically concerned with collecting household survey and census data and, hence, require 
clearly defined units of observation that can easily be identified in the field (Keilman and 
Keyfitz 1988: 255f.).  
However, several authors have pointed out difficulties in applying the household concept to 
non-Western societies. They caution that household members are not necessarily tied by 
blood or marriage (Hammel and Laslett 1974). For example, Chant (1997: 7) finds evidence 
with respect to female headed households, stating that these women are not necessarily the 
mothers of the children they reside with. Carter is particularly critical of using the household 
concept in West African societies as ‘the rights and duties of male and female household 
members are quite unlike those found in Eurasian households’ (Carter 1984: 52). This point 
has been elaborated by Koopman, who argues that ‘the assumptions of shared preferences and 
of pooled incomes and resources fundamentally misrepresent the structure and processes of 
production and consumption in most African agricultural households’ (Koopman 1991: 152). 
According to Koopman, the head of household, and his wife or wives (a gender constellation 
common to most households), conduct separate income generating activities, have different 
schedules for work and leisure, and are subject to very different gender specific social 
expectations and sanctions. The keeping of separate budgets among spouses was also 
empirically confirmed by other studies on sub-Saharan Africa (Clark 1994; Schindler 2006). 
Furthermore, Clark (1994: 331–334) argues that in matrilineal African societies, the duo local 
residential rules after marriage—in which bride and groom remain in their original location—
contradict the assumption of co-residency of the conventional European household concept. 
Similarly, Chant (1997: 6) cautions that some core household tasks, such as reproduction, take 
place outside the household boundaries and are performed within wider networks of relatives, 
friends, and neighbours in non-Western societies. As a conclusion, she critically asks if a 
general definition of household is desirable, given the fact that ‘“households” mean different 
things to different people in different places’—for example a kinship unit, economic unit, or 
housing unit (ibid.: 5).  
For the sub-Saharan African context, this paper proposes a modified version of Netting’s 
(1989: 231) definition:  
The household is a socially recognized domestic group. Its members are likely to share 
a common residence and to organize and carry on a range of consumption, inheritance, 
and reproductive activities. The specific content, intensity, and frequency of these 
activities vary by society, stage in the life cycle, and economic status of household 
members. Household inhabitants may be kin, but they may include friends, lodgers, 
and servants, and there are certainly family members who are not temporarily or 
permanently co-resident and cooperating.  
While mostly qualitative studies have contributed to the discussion of the household concept, 
the literature on (farm) household models has provided insights to the production decisions of 
households, while taking the definition of a household as given (for example, Bardhan and 
Udry 1999; Chayanov 1966 [1925]; de Janvry and Kanbur 2006; Singh et al. 1986). More 
recently, these models have been adapted to better fit the characteristics of rural developing 
economies, such as imperfect, incomplete or failing commodity markets (de Janvry et al. 
1991), credit markets (Carter 1989), and labour markets (Benjamin 1992; Strauss 1986). Part 
of this literature is used in the analysis of household behaviour during violent conflict, as 
described in the next section.      3
2.2  Economic research on violent conflict  
Conflict is grounded in the perception of at least partially incompatible interests between 
individuals or groups (Elwert 2004: 26), often concerning the allocation of property rights. As 
such, conflict is inherent to all societies; it is systematic and dynamic, and constitutes social 
action that is based on rational behaviour, as defined in a local context (Keen 1997). Conflict 
involves various methods of mediation, which determine its intensity. While conflict may 
entail significant costs, it may also entail positive effects on social cohesion, the capability of 
mediating future conflicts, and the stability of institutions (for example, through democratic 
debates in parliament). Traditionally, conflict has been perceived in the economic literature as 
a temporary exogenous shock, whereas it has been acknowledged recently that conflict is 
intrinsically endogenous to the development process (Keen 1997; Stewart 1993). More 
specifically, violent conflict is characterized by three dimensions (Berdal and Malone 2000; 
Keen 1997):  
1. Action which is non-cooperative, destructive, widespread, and persistent;  
2. Violation or capture of property rights over assets, persons, or institutions;  
3. Instigated through some degree of group (versus individual) activity.  
These three dimensions combine to shape different types of violent conflicts. At one extreme 
there are international wars and civil wars, which involve potentially destructive and often 
long lasting actions carried out by large groups or even entire nations (cf. Stewart and 
FitzGerald 2001: 3f.). With declining degrees of violence, destruction, persistence, and a 
diminishing scale of group involvement, violent conflict also encompasses genocide, 
revolutions, uprisings, mutinies, civil unrest, terrorism, organized crime, and gang violence.1 
Given the variety of modes of violent conflicts, this paper limits its focus to mass violent 
conflict which we assume, first, affects a large number of households in a given region or 
country, thus minimizing the opportunity to mitigate the economic effects of conflict, second, 
destabilizes the institutional and economic framework, and third, creates an uncertain and 
insecure environment.  
In many settings, the actual difference between active conflict and (at least the early) post-
conflict phase is not clear cut. Levels of violence and insecurity often remain high even after 
the official end of a conflict as it takes time to rebuild institutions, trust, and the enforcement 
of property rights. These features are perceived in this paper to combine to one specific type 
of fragility.2 
Economic research has commonly analysed conflict at the macro level, explaining both the 
causes and consequences of conflict, and using game theory approaches. An emerging field of 
economic research, which is the focus of this paper, examines conflict at the micro level.3 The 
unit of analysis in micro level analyses of conflict is either the household or, in fewer cases, 
the individual. The methods employed by these studies on conflict typically consist of 
                                                 
1  Some authors have defined a minimum death toll in order to determine the scale of conflict, e.g., more than 
1.000 violent deaths per year (e.g., Stewart and FitzGerald 2001: 3).  
2  See Binzel and Brück (2008) for a discussion of both the term ‘fragility’ and recent contributions in the 
literature.  
3  See Binzel and Brück (2007) and Justino (2006) for a detailed review of the household level literature on 
conflict.      4
quantitative econometric analyses of household or individual level survey data. However, the 
analysis of quantitative survey data entails some challenges: (i) there is no convention on how 
to account for conflict in survey datasets; (ii) data are likely to be biased because of sample 
attrition—individuals who died during a conflict are not represented in datasets; (iii) there are 
often difficulties in the sampling procedure. For example, the first nationally representative 
household living standard survey after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, collected between 2000 
and 2001, was based on a pre-genocide census. As a result, this survey does not take into 
account the estimated 800.000  deaths of the genocide which affected different Rwandan 
regions in different scales, nor does it depict the massive in and out migration of households; 
(iv) some regions of a post-conflict country may continue to suffer high levels of violence, 
hence preventing data collection. As a consequence of these obstacles, survey data collected 
in conflict affected countries is generally of worse quality than data collected in times of 
peace. For some conflict settings, there is no data available at all.  
As Stewart and FitzGerald (2001) and Keen (2001) have pointed out, the impacts of violent 
conflict can be divided into direct and indirect effects: the first consists of killing and 
wounding, while the second comprises ‘the indirect effects on human welfare of war induced 
changes in economic, social, and political life’ (Keen 2001: 46). Commonly, micro studies on 
conflict that use household survey data assess the indirect impacts of violent conflict, with 
poverty as a prevailing topic (Justino 2006). While some studies focus on direct poverty 
measures, such as income and consumption levels of households (Brück 2001b; Justino and 
Verwimp 2006; Luckham et al. 2001), other studies are concerned with non-monetary 
indicators of poverty in a conflict setting (see Justino 2006 for a survey). For example, 
Alderman et al. (2004) point out that civil war in Zimbabwe had a negative long term effect 
on the height of children. In Burundi, the civil war and subsequent economic embargo mostly 
affected children of rural households (Bundervoet and Verwimp 2005). Other household level 
research has been conducted on the impact of conflict on particular assets, such as land 
(Ansoms 2006; Brück and Schindler 2006) and cattle (Verpoorten 2005). Finally, some 
studies disentangle the indirect intra-household effects of conflict. Differentiating for gender, 
Akresh and Verwimp (2006) find that girls born in a conflict affected region in Rwanda after 
the civil war have a significantly lower health status, while boys do not seem to be affected. 
Conflict was also found to have a gendered effect on education in Tajikistan, where school 
enrolment was much more impeded for girls than for boys (Shemyakina 2006). Drawing a 
general conclusion, Stewart and FitzGerald (2001: 18) find that during violent conflict 
‘average levels of entitlements of all kinds are likely to decline’.  
Micro level studies employing individual level survey data or census data typically focus on 
the  direct effects of violent conflict, such as demographics, mortality, and fertility. For 
example, several studies are concerned with estimating mortality rates in Cambodia (de 
Walque 2006), Darfur (Guha-Sapir and Degomme 2005), and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Tabeau and Bijak 2006). One limitation of these studies is that individual level data generally 
do not account of households, thus impeding the analysis of poverty or production and 
consumption, which mostly involve the household as a whole.  
Besides the economic micro level literature on conflict, there is another body of empirical 
studies that focuses on livelihoods in conflict affected countries. Cross-cutting several social 
science disciplines, livelihood studies mainly rely on qualitative research techniques. In a 
review of livelihood studies in conflict affected settings, Holland et al. (2002) find three 
topics prevailing: malnutrition and the mortality of children, famine as a deliberate strategy of 
war, and migration. Research focusing on the topic of migration includes Young’s (2006) 
study on Darfur, where the conflict impeded migration and, hence, remittances, depriving the     5
local population of an important income source. Similarly, Ogden (2000) shows in her study 
on Kosovo that households without family members abroad were the most vulnerable to food 
insecurity in the 1990s, because they did not receive remittances. On the other hand, Clark 
(2006) argues that conflict also brought new opportunities for Congolese youngsters in 
refugee settlements, who increased their influence on decision making at the household and 
community level. In contrast to quantitative studies, this literature allows for more insights 
into the change in decision making processes and adaptive strategies to cope as a result of 
conflict. However, given their reliance on qualitative research methods, findings from 
livelihood studies often are only representative for their particular research area. As a result, it 
is difficult to derive general conclusions from this field of research.  
2.3  Literature on widows of conflict  
A wide range of factors can lead to widowhood: age difference between spouses, longer life 
expectancies of women in most parts of the world, a husband’s untimely death due to an 
accident or a health shock, and a husband’s violent death during conflict. Widows of conflict 
may differ among the way their husbands died during conflict—if he was killed in combat, or 
died as a civil casualty. Furthermore, there are ‘false widows’ (Roussou 1987: 38f.), whose 
husbands disappeared during conflict, with an unknown fate. There are also ‘de facto widows’ 
Chant 1997: 12f.), whose husbands live permanently apart from them, for example, as a result 
of long term migration or a prison sentence. Generally, widowhood is a time dependent state, 
as widows may arrange to remarry quickly in order to protect their livelihood. In the 
following, households that are headed by, or simply include widows are considered (see 
Section 4.3 below). We posit that those living as a head of a household face more challenges 
in reconstructing their livelihood.  
Analysing widows of mass violent conflict empirically has several challenges. (a) Not all 
widows in a given post-conflict setting have lost their husband because of a violent death;  
(b) it is difficult to capture the time dynamics of widowhood through cross-sectional data;  
(c) widows may be constantly moving among different households of relatives and are 
therefore difficult to identify from survey data (United Nations 2001: 4).  
There are two branches of literature that concern widows of mass violent conflict: First, an 
academic literature, and second, empirical case studies and reports from policy oriented 
organizations operating in conflict settings. Academic studies on widows mostly have their 
origin in the social sciences. To our knowledge, no economic studies have addressed widows 
of conflict so far in neither developing nor developed countries. This is surprising, given the 
number of war widows in the aftermath of the Second World War. Economic studies on 
widows in Western societies have implicitly assumed a peacetime environment, where 
widowhood is typically conceived as a feature of aging societies. Common topics of this 
literature are widow’s pension, state welfare, and life insurance (Brien et al. 2004; Fitzgerald 
1989; McGarry and Schoeni 2005; Skevik 2004). A general finding of this literature is that 
widows in Western societies are often vulnerable to poverty (Hurd and Wise 1989, 1991; 
McDonald et al. 2000; Weir and Willis 2000).  
There are surprisingly few academic studies that specifically address the situations of widows 
in conflict settings in developing countries. While much research has been conducted on the 
gendered effects of violent conflict, widows are only mentioned marginally, if at all (for 
example, Afshar and Eade 2004; Koen 2006; Pampell Conaway 2006; Ridd and Callaway 
1987). For example, in her book on women headed households in developing countries, Chant 
(1997) only dedicates one paragraph to widowhood as a possible cause for female headship. 
An exception is Turshen’s (2001) study on sexual violence against women in violent     6
conflicts. She finds Rwandan widows in the post-genocide environment to be very vulnerable 
to extortion and expropriation of their husbands’ land. However, a widow has more 
bargaining power to claim her land if she is the mother of a son and can show her ability to 
farm. In this case a widow may claim custodianship of her son’s inheritance until he reaches 
adult age (ibid.: 66).  
In contrast, there is a large body of policy oriented empirical case studies that address the role 
and fate of women during wartime and the reconstruction period (see Brück and Vothknecht 
2007 for a survey). Many of these studies acknowledge that widows are not only a large scale 
phenomenon in post-conflict settings, but that they are also particularly vulnerable to poverty 
(for example, United Nations 2001: 4f.). Although few of these studies focus exclusively on 
widows, most of them allow considerable room to describe the specific challenges facing 
widows. Studies in this field can be grouped into two subcategories: On one hand, there are 
qualitative case studies that provide in-depth analyses of specific areas. Typically, these 
studies are based on extensive and original testimonies of victims. For instance, Newbury and 
Baldwin (2000) describe the challenges faced by widows of the Rwandan genocide in 
accessing land. Nowrojee (1996) points out that Rwandan widows in the post-genocide period 
are subject to discrimination in various regards, which significantly reduces their living 
standard as compared to other households. On the other hand, there is a variety of reports that 
draw general conclusions from a range of case studies on the impact of war on women and 
widows and formulate implications for policy interventions (El-Bushra 2003b; Lindsey 
undated; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; United Nations 2001, 2002; WCRWC 1997).  
To conclude, it seems that the policy literature on widows of conflict is far ahead of academic 
research in this respect.  
3  Gaps in the literature and research questions 
The economic literature on conflict reviewed above entails three gaps. First, even though the 
micro level literature on conflict focuses on the household as a unit of analysis, not much is 
known about how large scale violent conflict and post-conflict fragility affect household 
structure. It has been criticized that the household is often considered as a black box in the 
literature in peacetime (Wilk 1990: 323f.); this applies even more to conflict settings. For 
example, while there is ample evidence from qualitative empirical case studies that gender 
roles within the household may change as a result of conflict this topic has not been analysed 
systematically. This leads us to the following research questions: How does violent conflict 
affect the composition, function, and structure of households? This also includes investigating 
the change of gender roles within the household as a result of violent conflict. Furthermore, 
there is no systematic research so far on how this issue affects widows of conflict.  
Second, it is not known in detail how households actually cope with violent conflict and 
fragility—particularly those households which are mostly affected by conflict. More 
specifically, very little quantitative research has been conducted on how households move 
between various income generating activities as a response to different economic 
environments, and to protect their livelihoods. Of the few existing studies, Brück (2004) 
provides insight into the activity choices of farm households in post-war Mozambique, which 
operate in an uncertain environment. Verpoorten (2005) shows how coping strategies of rural 
households in Rwanda changed during the genocide: while she finds that cattle sales were 
limited during times of peace, the sale of cattle increased enormously during violent conflict 
as a result of fear of raiding, need for food, and the migration of cattle owning households. 
Hence the second research question asks: What are the coping strategies of conflict affected     7
households? Furthermore, as has been proposed by Justino (2006: 13f.), this question should 
link in with more detailed questions regarding the vulnerability of these households in terms 
of poverty, the role of assets in their coping strategies, and their capabilities to use choice 
based, versus forced strategies. Again, this question will also be applied to widows of conflict, 
as there is no evidence on the coping strategies of these particular households so far.  
A third gap in the household level literature on conflict is an analysis concerning the impact 
of conflict on groups of households. Groups have been a common topic in explaining the 
causes and motives of conflict, as mentioned in Section 2.2. Most prominently, the concept of 
horizontal inequality has been employed to measure the relative share in entitlements between 
groups, classified by social class, ethnicity, religion, and other cultural characteristics (Stewart 
1998). However, violent conflict affects households in different ways, as conflict may not 
only lead to economic, social, and political disruption but may also foster new economic 
activities, such as military industry and foreign aid (Cramer 1997; Keen 2001). Clearly, 
violent conflict makes some households worse-off and others better-off, thereby affecting 
households’ ability to reconstruct their livelihoods in the post-conflict period. So far, only a 
few studies have analysed the impact of conflict on groups systematically. Some exceptions 
include the study on the differentiation of victims and perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide 
(Verwimp 2003) and child soldiers (Blattman 2006). The research questions addressing this 
gap are: How do groups of households cope with conflict? Furthermore, it will be analysed in 
how far common features of group members determine households’ coping strategies. In a 
second step, the question will be applied to households that include or are headed by widows 
of conflict, one particular type of groups of households.  
4  A conceptual framework for the analysis  
The gaps are addressed in the following three subsections. Each section first provides 
conceptual notes and then illustrates the proposed matters to widows of conflict as one 
example of conflict affected households.  
4.1 Household  structure  and  intra-household issues  
This section analyses three channels through which mass violent conflict affects households, 
namely household boundaries, household activities and intra-household relations, and gender 
roles.  
While the household is a flexible construct, as has been argued above, its definition and 
function are even more fluid during conflict and a period of fragility following conflict. 
Household boundaries may become permeable during conflict as members may die, due to 
acts of both violence and indirect casualties, also called ‘excess death’. While usually more 
men die of violence, it is commonly assumed that more children and women die as a result of 
indirect effects of violent conflict, including deteriorating supplies of food and health care and 
the loss of livelihoods. Furthermore, male adults may be mobilized for war, while in some 
conflicts minors are abducted for service in militia groups. In general, the ratio of male to 
female household members is likely to decrease. Also, households may face the temporary or 
permanent separation of members due to displacement. New members may be integrated into 
the household, for instance orphaned or widowed individuals who may or may not be 
relatives. As a result, the overlapping of household membership and kinship—a common 
assumption in the literature—may not necessarily be the case. The integration of new 
members may lead to new constellations of households that go beyond the socially recognized 
norm of a given society in times of peace. For example, separated and orphaned children or     8
individuals stranded in a refugee camp may form a household (Clark 2006). Hence, the 
formation and dissolution of households during violent conflict is no longer primarily 
determined by life cycle events, such as birth, leaving the parental home, marriage, birth of 
children, departure of the children from home, death of a partner, and, simply, death 
(Willekens 1988: 95).  
Violent conflict also has an impact on households’ activities, most importantly constraining 
households in earning a livelihood. Direct and indirect casualties affect a household’s 
membership and potentially decrease the ratio of net producers to net consumers in the 
household (Chayanov 1966 [1925]). The surviving household members may be constrained in 
their ability to work because of injuries, psychological trauma after the experience of 
violence, the loss of family members, and malnutrition. Tasks that require individuals to move 
away from the household compound, such as water fetching from a distant well or cultivating 
fields outside the village, may be kept to a minimum because an insecure and fragile 
environment poses a threat to individuals. Also, the educational system may be interrupted 
during and after the conflict, thus obstructing children from acquiring human capital 
(Shemyakina 2006). Other household activities which may no longer be performed as a 
consequence of the formation of new households in a conflict setting are reproduction and 
inheritance. This may be the case if newly formed households consist of members who are not 
related through kinship or marriage, or are of the same sex. However, violent conflict may 
also stimulate new activities. For example, household members who conducted separate 
income earning activities in times of peace may pool their resources and jointly generate an 
income in a conflict setting. Their motivation may change as a result of an insecure 
environment, which may have few insurance options and, therefore, expose individual income 
generating activities to high risk.  
Finally, intra-household relations and gender roles are affected by conflict. The allocation of 
tasks within the household may change across genders. For example, women may perform 
productive activities that are confined to men during times of peace. Women’s involvement in 
productive activities is in turn likely to increase women’s decision making power inside the 
household. Then again, depending on the type of conflict, women’s liberty of action may be 
restricted during conflict, especially when women are targeted, as a deliberate war strategy 
intended to dishonour the enemy conflict party (Ridd 1987: 3). In general, changes in gender 
roles have the largest impact when women become the head of a household. In some post-war 
settings, female headed households were found to reach up 30  per cent and more of all 
households (El-Bushra 2003b: 18; Gervais 2004: 304). Besides gender, the roles and tasks of 
children and the elderly may also be affected by conflict, for example if labour input is needed 
to sustain the household’s livelihood. Consequently, the allocation of income and resources 
within the household may be different in a conflict setting. Assuming that the household lives 
closer to the survival threshold, income and resources could be either more or less equally 
distributed among household members. Some studies caution that gender roles are only 
modified temporarily for the duration of conflict, but often return to the pre-conflict norm 
when conflict ends (Ridd and Callaway 1987: 3f.).  
War widows may face particular constraints in consumption and production. While all 
households in a conflict setting may reorganize membership as a strategy to generate income 
(especially in labour intensive agriculture), widows may adopt this strategy to cope with 
societal pressure against single women. Widows may reconfigure their household, form new 
ones, become widow headed, take in orphans or other widows, or join the households of 
relatives. As a result, household membership in a conflict setting may not overlap with 
kinship, thus posing difficulties for widows to claim their rights to their husband’s assets in     9
societies which hand inheritance along the patriliny. Because of their sex, widows are more 
vulnerable to attacks and sexual violence in both the conflict and post-conflict period than 
men (Csete and Kippenberg 2002; El-Bushra 2003a). Widows are more likely to co-reside 
with their household members for security reasons, which may not be common during times 
of peace. The impact of conflict induced changes in gender roles, in addition to the allocation 
of resources, income, and decision making power on widows, depends on the household 
constellation they live in. For example, widows who become heads of households or who live 
in female headed households may become the principle caretaker of other household 
members, and therefore assume responsibilities in decision making and productive tasks (El-
Bushra and Piza-Lopez 1994: 181). In contrast, it is conceivable that widows lose decision 
making power if there are working age male household members present in the household.  
4.2  Coping strategies of households in conflict  
This section considers each of the inputs required for household production separately.  
The channels and intensity of impact may range across the duration of conflict, its regional 
diffusion, the degree of participation and mobilization, and the duration of fragility after 
conflict ended. Most importantly, the impact of conflict on a particular household depends on 
the household’s involvement in conflict (for example, if the household is a passive unit that 
aims at avoiding conflict, or if its members actively engage in conflict and take advantage of 
the opportunity to loot, extort, and appropriate). This in turn depends on the causes and 
motives of conflict, for example if some households are specifically targeted because of their 
religion, ethnic affiliation, or social class (see Verwimp 2004 for Rwanda). Similarly, violent 
conflict has a larger adverse impact on poorer households, as they may be more vulnerable to 
shocks and have fewer coping strategies available than relatively wealthier households 
(Binzel and Brück 2007).  
The previous section has shown how conflict may reduce a household’s labour endowments 
because of direct and indirect war casualties.  
Landmines confine a household from the use of its land endowments. Furthermore, the 
allocation of customary use rights over land may be interrupted if local institutions cease to 
exist (Brück and Schindler 2006; Moser and McIlwaine 1999: 208). This in turn renders 
marginalized households vulnerable to loosing their access to land. While displaced 
households may not have land available for cultivation in their new environment, and 
therefore may not pursue agricultural production, the return of long term refugees may create 
additional pressure on land (Ansoms 2006), thus potentially increase fragility. Households 
that lack access to land are likely to face constraints in the credit market as they lack collateral 
securities. Finally, farm households may also refrain from cultivating their fields since this 
may attract looters and endanger the security of household members.  
Looting of property, pillage, and the destruction of existing capital are typical features of 
mass violent conflict, as individual property rights over assets may no longer be enforced. For 
example, the number of cattle decreased significantly during the civil war in Mozambique 
(Brück 2001a: 66), and also during the Rwandan civil war and genocide (McKay and 
Loveridge 2005: 5). In addition, a fragile environment and the unpredictability of the course 
of conflict may reduce the household’s incentive to invest. Lastly, markets for agricultural 
inputs, such as tools, seeds, and fertilizers, may be interrupted, thus rendering farm production 
less efficient. However, while on average the capital endowments per household are likely to 
decrease sharply during conflict, some households are certainly in a position to take 
advantage of the institutional breakdown during conflict and appropriate new assets.      10
As a result of physical insecurity to humans and the interruption of local markets, a household 
may decide to employ different income generating strategies to cope with the conflict shock. 
For example, a household may retreat from the market and shift towards subsistence 
production (McKay and Loveridge 2005) or may sell some of its productive assets for fear of 
looting (Verpoorten 2005). A change in income generating strategies may require a different 
production technology, i.e., a distinct set of skills and abilities. Also, societies experiencing 
violent conflict face a breakdown of social cohesion, trust, and traditional social protection 
mechanisms (Moser and McIlwaine 1999: 207f.), which may impede risk sharing, the 
formation of work sharing groups, or communication networks. The combined impact of mass 
violent conflict on each of the farm production factors reduces a household’s options to cope. 
In other words, income generating strategies may no longer be determined by choice, but 
forced upon households by circumstances. This may result in falling output and food 
shortages, which again poses a threat to the continuity of the household.  
As mentioned in Section 4.1 above, widows are affected by shortages in labour endowments. 
This is particularly true if working age males are absent; as a result, widows lack their 
working and income earning power (El-Bushra and Piza-Lopez 1994: 181). Also, widows 
may face cultural taboos and discriminatory customary laws to own land (WCRWC 1997: 6), 
the most important physical endowment for a rural household. For instance, widows are at 
risk of losing the rights of their deceased husband’s endowments to the husband’s kin-group. 
A widow’s position against claims from relatives is even weaker if she is childless, lost 
children during conflict, or was a victim of rape and so does not continue her husband’s line. 
Similar to other land constrained households, widows are also likely to be constrained in their 
access to credit (Nowrojee 1996; WCRWC 2000: 9). Additionally, widows may face 
difficulties to access their husband’s capital endowments. This particularly poses a problem if 
inheritance is passed through the male line, thereby making marriage the most important 
channel for women to access assets. As Turshen states, ‘any control women have over land 
and income depends on their personal relationships with individual men’ (Turshen 2001: 66). 
There is evidence that widows are disadvantaged in inheriting land and other productive 
assets even in peacetime in developing countries (Deininger and Castagnini 2004; Parpart 
2000). Widows may also face constraints in earning a livelihood. Some (typical for female) 
income generating activities, such as petty trade, may be impossible during conflict because 
of threats to their security or interrupted markets. Also, cultural taboos may inhibit women to 
perform particular productive tasks; for instance, Gervais (2004: 307) reports a taboo for 
women to engage in the construction of housing in Rwanda. While the absence of men 
obliges widows to assume new responsibilities, they may be ill-prepared and lack the 
production technology to shift to new income generating strategies (Csete and Kippenberg 
2002; Tercier Holst-Roness 2006; WCRWC 2000). Furthermore, widow headed households 
may face difficulties to access output markets in societies where markets are traditionally a 
male dominated domain (El-Bushra 2003b). Widows may also be marginalized socially as 
they are a symbol of disorder, and may be feared of destructing existing marriages (Chant 
1997: 63; Nowrojee 1996). As a consequence, widows may be excluded from risk-sharing 
networks, which increases their vulnerability to poverty and food shortages.  
4.3  Group behaviour in conflict  
Groups can be classified along various dimensions. First, the changeability of common 
features that identify an individual as a member of a group may range between the extremes 
of fixed features, such as place of birth, and highly adaptable features, such as membership in     11
a union.4 Second, common features may visibly and univocally distinguish individuals of 
various groups, while on the other extreme, features may only be known to the members 
themselves. Examples for the former are skin colour or sex, while the latter may be 
represented by political attitude. Third, the degree of individuals’ perception to share common 
features with other individuals may range considerably. On one hand, individuals sharing 
common features may have no sense of belonging. On the other hand, individuals may have a 
strong sense of sharing common features and interests with each other and strongly identify 
with the group. This dimension correlates with varying degrees of group organization, ranging 
from no organization at all, such as all males in a given society, to highly active lobby groups.  
These three dimensions combine to create various types of groups. According to this 
definition, members of one household would also form a group, sharing the common feature 
of co-residence. However, the household, and not the individual, is considered as the unit of 
analysis, given that individual level data on consumption, assets, and behaviour are often not 
available. As a result, only groups of households are considered; it is assumed that one or 
more household members carry a feature that marks the household as a whole as member of a 
particular group.  
Such a definition of the group leads to considering how mass violent conflict and fragility 
affect a number of households that are alike in some regards, but which are not necessarily 
organized. As Keen (2001) pointed out, households perform differently in the post-conflict 
period—hence there are winners and losers when conflict is over. Factors that contribute to 
these differential influences include households’ involvement in conflict as active or passive 
agents,5 their status as perpetrators or victims, and households’ exposure to attacks, such as 
their ethnic, religious, regional or political affiliation, and the location of residence. An 
interesting topic of research following out of this could be a comparison of within group 
effects of conflict with between group effects intended to determine the impacts of certain 
group features. Further research could analyse if and to what degree common features of a 
group determine similar coping strategies of households.  
Households that include one or more widows of conflict are considered to be one example of 
a conflict affected group. Considering the above mentioned definition, widowhood is a fixed 
feature at least in the short term. Although not directly visible, the marital status of individuals 
is very likely to be known to community members. It is assumed that widows have a 
perception of the fate of other widows, while their involvement in a common interest group 
depends on the particular setting. There is evidence from very active widows organizations 
(Rehn and Sirleaf 2002: 77). However, widows of conflict are also a diverse group: they may 
differ widely in age, the number of children, and in their social position, within both the 
household and the community. Similarly, their experience of conflict may be very different, 
depending on their social class (El-Bushra 2003b: 24). Also, the way their husband died may 
affect widows’ social standing in the post-conflict period. The common feature is their marital 
status as widows, which is an important determinant for their material circumstances and their 
moral standing within the society (Chant 1997: 11). As mentioned earlier widows face even 
more challenges if they become heads of household. For example, female headed households 
                                                 
4  A similar definition is employed to define ethnicity (e.g., Bates 1999; Van Hoyweghen and Vlassenroot 
2000).  
5  While participation in conflict is carried out at the individual level, it is assumed that the decision regarding 
which household members participate in conflict in which ways is made at the household level, taking 
consumption, production, and risk for all household members into consideration.      12
have been identified to be potentially vulnerable to chronic poverty in peacetime in many 
developing countries (Chronic Poverty Research Centre 2004: chapter 2), which is even more 
common in a conflict or fragile environment.  
In order to determine the impact of widowhood empirically, several different constellations of 
households could be compared: First, male headed households that include widows of conflict 
as members versus male headed households without widows; second, female headed 
households that include widows (but not as heads of households) versus widow headed 
households; third, widow headed households that also include working age male members 
versus widow headed households without adult males; and fourth, male headed households 
without widows versus widow headed households without adult male members. We 
hypothesize that the fourth case comparison will display the largest differences in terms of 
asset endowments, choice of coping strategies, and welfare, because it includes the combined 
effects of widowhood, female headedness, and lack of adult male members. Also, the third 
case comparison may expose a large effect for similar reasons.  
5 Conclusions   
The paper aimed at analysing the transmission channels through which mass violent conflict 
and post-conflict fragility affect the household. Three key findings were presented. First, mass 
violent conflict is likely to have a strong impact on household boundaries, activities, and 
intra-household relations, including gender roles, which may significantly transform the core 
functions of households. Second, conflict may destruct production inputs and hence limit the 
choices of income generating activities of households. Third, the paper proposed a modified 
concept of group that allows identifying groups of households that share common features but 
are not necessarily organized or aware of their common features.  
These findings advance the literature on the economics of conflict and development by 
underlining the need to analyse the impact of conflict and fragility at the household level. 
Also, the paper has pointed out the need to analyse the impact of conflict on several 
production inputs jointly in order to determine if income generating strategies of households 
are choice based or forced by circumstances. Furthermore, the concept of group proposed in 
this paper may be used to determine if common features determine the choice of coping 
strategies of groups of households; this may indicate the existence of a poverty trap for entire 
groups of households.  
The approach proposed in this paper is suitable to analyse policy relevant case studies of 
conflict affected groups, such as war widows, children, or displaced households. On the one 
hand, the needs of these households may be determined, which may then be used to inform 
policy. On the other hand, a needs assessment of particular groups can be compared with 
existing policies in order to evaluate their performance and targeting.  
Future research in this field may address the topics discussed in this paper empirically. Such 
an empirical approach poses several challenges—for instance, grasping the local concept of 
the household, identifying households in a conflict setting from survey data, or identifying 
relevant groups of households that are affected by conflict in a common way. This may call 
for a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods.  
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